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[L. A. No. 19063. In Bank. June 2!l. 1!l4!>.] 
BYRON PEEBLER et a1., Respondents, v. B. C. OLDS 
et a1., Appellants. 
[1J Appeal-Briefs-Relief from Default.-An appellant 11 days 
in default in filing his brief at the time of filing a motion to 
dismiss was relieved of his default where the failure to explain 
such delay and his further delay were attributable to a motion 
to strike the reporter's transeript filed with the motion to dis- , 
miss, and where a brief had been served and was tendered for I 
filing at the time of the argument on the motions. (Rules on 
Appeal. rule 17(a).) 
licK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 902; [2J Appeal 
and Error, § 770; [3] Appeal and Error, § 820.L 
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[2J Yd. - Record - Alternative Method - Relief from Default.-
Und!'r t.he former rulp~ of appeal by which a deJay in j!'ivinJ! a 
noti('(' requestin~ a report('r'!; trnn!;cript couJd be' excuReo by 
the trial c011rt, it WItR not an abuse of discretion to relieve 
from 8evprlll months' delay duE' to objection!; to a bill of ex('ep-
tion!; lino the absence of the trial .ill0!r(' bf'cans(' of iIlneRR, 
[8] Yd. - Record - Objections - Relief from Default.-Unoer the 
npw Rules on AppeaJ. thE' r('viewin~ court is ¢ven exelllsivl" 
power to grant reJi('f from default occasioneo by noncompli-
anc(' ther('with. 
Motions to strike the reporter's transcript and to dismiss 
an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of 1101'1 An-
geleR County. Carl A. St.ut-ame.n, Judge. Motions denied. 
J. M. Danziger, in pro. per" for Appellants. 
Roland Maxwell for Respondents. 
THE COURT.-The matters before us arise upon an appeal 
from. a judgment granting a permanent injunction. On May 
26, 1944, the clerk's and reporter's transcripts were fUed in 
the reviewing court. On July 6, forty-one days later, respond· 
ents noticed a motion to be heard September 27, to strike the 
reporter's transcript on the ground that it WRIi not prepared 
Rnd certified within the time or in the manner prescribed by 
law. Included in the same document and designated t9 be 
heard at the same time, was a motion to dismiss'the appeal 
for failure of the appellants to file their opening brief. 
[1] The time for the filing of an opening brief is prescribed 
in rule 16(a) of the Rules on Appeal, and an opening brief not 
filed within the thirty-day period there prescribed, or within 
any valid extension allowed thereunder, is in default. There-
fore, in the absence of any valid extension of time, appellants' 
opening brief was due thirty days after filing of the record, 
or on June 25, 1944. When respondents on July 6 filed their 
motion to dismiss, appellants were in default for a period of 
only eleven days. Rule 17(a) provides, in part, that "If the 
appellant's opening brief is not fUed within the time prescribed 
in subdivision (a) of Rule 16, the clerk of the reviewing court 
shall notify the parties by mail that if the brief is not filed 
(2] See 2 Oal.Jur. 630. 
\ 
/ 
/ 
) 
/ 
~58 f26 ~.2d 
within 30 days after the date of mailing of the notification, 
the appeal will be diRmiRsed, unless good cause is shown for 
relief .... " It is thus apparent from rule 17(a) that the 
reviewing court has a broad power to grant relief from de-
fault. (See, also, rule 53(b).) It is true that the rules con-
template that some explanation be offered for the default. 
and while the record herein does not affirmatively reveal any 
specific reason for the· eleven-day delay we are satisfied that 
the failure to explain the same as well as the further delay in 
the filing of the brief, is traceable to the second part of re-
spondents' motion which was directed at the striking of the 
reporter's transcript. It is apparent from the record herein 
that it was the latter motion which principally absorbed the 
attention of the parties . 
.AB stated above. when respondents on July 6 moved to dis-
miss the appeal because of the eleven-day default in the filing 
of the opening brief, they also noticed a motion to strike the 
reporter's transcript. Both motions, as indicated above, were 
designated to be heard on September 27, a period of two and 
one-half months in the future. Confronted with this bifur-
cated motion-a portion of which potentially might alter or 
change the nature of the record on which the appeal was to be 
presented-any further delay in the filing of appellants' open-
ing brief is understandable and excusable. Obviously'. while 
the motion to strike the reporter's transcript was pending ap-
pellants could not intelligently prepare their brief for if the 
reporter's transcript· were stricken they would have to pro-
ceed on the clerk's transcript or judgment roll. The character 
of the record would make a material difference in the sub-
stance of their brief. While correct practice should have sug-
gested that they seek additional time for the filing of the brief. 
particularly when the clerk's transcript was on file and un-
challenged. nevertheles.c;, under all the circumstances, the de-
fault occurring while appellants were availing themselves of 
their right to present their appeal upon a full and proper 
record should be relieved. (C/. Riskin v. Towers, 24 CaUd 
274, 277 [148 P.2d 611, 153 A.L.R. 442].) After the motion, 
the uncertainty arising from the proceedings in connection 
with the record offers a reasonable explanation for appellants' 
default in the filing of the brief. Moreover, the brief has been 
since served on respondents and was tendered for ining at the 
time of the oral argument herein. We are of the opinion, 
) 
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therefore, that appellants should be relieved of any default 
in connection with the filing of their opening brief. and 
the same may be filed. 
[2] This leaves for consideration the motion to strike the 
reporter's transcript. Inasmuch as the notice of appeal. was 
filed before the effective date of the new Rules on Appeal, the 
law in effect prior thereto governs this motion. (Rule 53 (b) .) 
It appears that originally appellants had elected to· appeal on 
a bill of exceptions. A period of several months elapsed in 
the consideration of objections thereto, proposals for amend-
ment and efforts to terminate the proceeding. Finally, appel-
lants themselves terminated the proceeding and were . allowed 
by the trial court ten days within which to give notice re-
questing a reporter's transcript. Respondents unSuccessfully 
attempted to restrain this new proceeding for a record by 
petition for a writ of prohibition. (Peebler v. Superior Court, 
63 Cal.App.2d 65l [147 P.2d 34].) . 
Under the law in effect prior to the new Rules on Appeal, 
the notice requesting a transcript was not jurisdictional, and 
delay in giving such notice could be excused by the trial court. 
The matter of diligence in preparation of the record was 
almost entirely committed to the discretion of the trial court, 
and its action in certifying a belatedly prepared· reporter's 
transcript t-elieved the appellants from any asserted lack of 
diligence. (Troy v. Troy, 127 Cal.App. 489, 492 [16 P.2d 
290]; Crocker v. Crocker, 76 Cal.App. 606 [245 P. 438]; 
Sekt v. Superior Court, 24 Ca1.2d 73, 77 [147 P.2d 568]; 
Wood v. Peterson Farms Co., 131 Cal.App. 312, ?15 (21 P.2d 
468J; Smith v. Jacard, 20 Cal.App. 280 [128 P. 1023, 1026]; 
Hoknemann v. Pacific Gas ct Elec. Co., 31 Cal.App.2d 692 
[88 P.2d 748J.) The record het-ein does not show any abuse of 
the trial court's discretion .. The delay consequent upon the 
objections to the proposed bill of exceptions and the absence 
of the trial judge because of illness furnished sufficient basis 
for the trial court's action in relieving appellants from the 
e1Iects of the delay in completing the record. The motion to 
strike the reporter's transcript must therefore be denied. 
[3] In order to obviate contusion, it is well to state that 
under the new Rules on Appeal the trial court may extend 
time only for limited periods upon application made before the 
expiration of any prescribed time. It cannot grant relief from 
default. The reviewiDg court is given exclusive powel' to do 
/ 
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so. (Rules on Appeal, rule 53(b); Averill v. Lincoln, 24 Cal. 
2d 761, 763 [151 P.2d 119]; Jarkieh v. Badagliacco, 68 Cal. 
App.2d 426, 430 [156 P.2d 969]; 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 232, 
292.) 
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to strike the re-
porter's transcript and to dismiss the appeal are denied. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent from that part of the majority 
opinion dealing with the granting of relief frGm appellant's 
conceded default in the filing of his opening brief. It fails 
to meet the basic issue in this proceeding, for it considers the 
problem as if the default took place in the course of an appeal 
pending in this court. If this were the case, and appellant's 
request for relief from default were addressed to us, it would 
be entirely appropriate to consider his excuses, and either 
grant or deny relief in our own discretion. The appeal was 
pending, however, in the District Court of Appeal, Second 
Appellate District, Division Two, for determination, and the 
record and briefs had to be filed in that court. The delays and 
default took place there; the motion to dismiss the appeal was 
made in that court, argued there, and decided, after submis-
sion, by a written opinion. A petition for hearing was there-
after filed and granted by this court. . 
The Rules on Appeal recognize, of course, that the "review-
ing court," which has the power to grant or deny relief from 
default, is the court in which the appeal is pending. (Rule 
40(b).) Hence, the power to relieve from default in the in-
stant case originally resided in the District Court of Appeal. 
In its decision granting the motion to dismiss and in the ac-
companying opinion, that court set forth its determination 
that appellant's neglect was inexcusable and did not justify 
relief. The question before us is not, therefore, as the major-
ity opinion assumes, what showing must be made by an ap-
pellant to call for the exercise of our discretion to grant re-
lief from a default, but a much more important question: to 
what extent will the Supreme Court undertake to regulate the 
exercise of such discretion by the District Court of Appeal' 
When the petition for hearing in this court was granted, 
the decision and opinion of the District Court of Appeal were, 
of course, superseded, and the case was set at large for a Dew 
and .independent decision by the Supreme Court. This court 
the~pl: became the reviewing court, with the same power to 
June 1945J PEEBLEU 1'. OLI)S 
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grant or deny relief from default as if the case had originally 
been appealed here. (Rule 40(b).) It does not follow, how-
ever, that in the exercise of this power we should entirely ig-
nore the action previously taken by the District Court of 
Appeal, and attach no presumption of correctness to the con-
clusion reached by that court after mature consideration of 
the record and argument presented to it. In following that 
course the majority opinion simply advises the District Court 
of Appeal that its determination of procedural matters within 
its jurisdiction is entitled to no weight. This view is in strik-
ing contrast to the deference that this court showed to the 
superior courts during the period preceding the new Rules 
on Appeal, when those courts had power to relieve from de-
faults in connection with the record. The rule was estab-
lished by many well considered discussions, some of which 
are cited in the majority opinion, that the trial judge had 
a broad discretion in these matters, and that on an appeal 
or other proceeding to review his determination, that dis-
cretion was to be upheld unless plainly abusea. 
If we adhere, as I think we should, to this traditional ap-
proach, it would seem to follow that the respective functions 
of the District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in 
the situation before us may thus be differentiated: (1) On the 
meaning and effect of a rule, a question of law, this court 
should exercise its usual reviewing power regarding any peti-
tion for hearing after Ii decision by the District Court of 
Appeal. (2) When the issue is whether the party has in fact 
complied with a particular rule, this court should likewise 
exercise its usual reviewing power. (3) If it appears from 
the record, however, that the party is actually in default by 
his failure to comply with a rule, and has sought to be re-
lieved from such default, the decision of the appellate court 
in the exercise of its discretion in granting or refusing such 
relief should not be disturbed except where there is manifest 
miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, our task here was to 
decide whether the appellate court had plainly abused its 
discretion under the circumstances of this case, and such a 
conclusion could only be reached if it appeared that the ap-
pellants had so persuasive a reason for their failure to file 
the opening brief that it necessarily called for an applica-
tion of the power to grant relief. 
) 
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The majority opinion does not suggest that any such showing 
was made; it does not recite all of the circumstances and COIl· 
siderations that impelled the District Court of Appeal to dis· 
miss the appeal. This method of handling the case may well 
prove to be an unfortunate precedent. I am entirely in sym-
pathy with the view that hearings on the merits should be 
encouraged and that excusable neglect should be relieved by 
the appellate court having jurisdiction of the appeal. But 
it is of equal importance to litigants and the courts that dila-
tory tactics of counsel be discouraged and that the appellate 
courts not be hampered in carrying out their duties. 
The appellants have offered two reasons for their neglect. 
They contend that they were not ~ctually in default, since the 
District Court of Appeal clerk failed to give the notice under 
rule 17 (a). This misconception finds no justification in the 
rule and is contrary to the holdings of prior cases. (See Peak 
v. Nicholson, 61 Cal.App.2d 355, 359 [143 P.2d 7S]; Witkin, 
New California Rules on Appeal, 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. SO, 142.) 
Accordingly appellant's conduct must be regarded, not as 
the result of an excusable mistake, but as a plain disregard 
of the rule. 
The other explanation offered by appellants is that while 
the dispute concerning the record was in progress, they were 
llncertain as to whether they would eventually obtain a re-
porter's transcript or would be compelled to take their appeal 
solely on a clerk's transcript, and that this uncertainty made 
it impossible for them to write an opening brief with reference 
to the actual record in the case. Had this explanation been 
addressed to the appellate court by way of a request for ex-
tension of time (see rule 16(a» it would undoubtedly have 
been favorably received. A sound reason for requesting an 
extension of time, however, is not a justification for com-
pletely disregarding the rule. It is commonplace in all prac-
tice that the party whose time is running on the many steps 
.required in trial and appellate procedure, and who has a 
good ground for extension of that time, must present it before 
his time expires. Otherwise his position becomes entirely 
different, and his only recourse is to seek relief from his de-
fault by a showing that he allowed the time to run against him 
by inadvertence or excusable neglect. There is no such show-
ing in the instant ca.~e. Appellants, insisting upon an errone-
\ 
\ 
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ous int.erpretation of the rules, have deliberately failed to 
comply with their plain language. Previous delays occasioned 
by disputes over the record had already resulted in postpon-
ing the hearing on the appeal for over a year, and it was in-
cumbent upon appellants to exercise reasonable diligence to 
avoid additional delays. 
It appears, therefore, that the District Court of Appeal 
acted well within the limits of its discretion in denying ap-
pellants relief from their default in failing to file their open-
ing brief on time. 
Every court, and in particular every reviewing court, bears 
a heavy responsibility for the prompt and efficient handling of 
its business, and it can discharge that responsibility only if 
it is permitted a reasonable discretion and control over its 
affairs. The new Rules on Appeal are designed to secure the 
speedy determination of appeals (see rule 53 (a» and to that 
end each appellate court is given supervisory power over the 
procedural steps in the taking of appeals. The Supreme Court 
should not undertake to reexamine the various considerations 
that enter into the discretionary determination to grant or 
deny relief from default. The appellate courts cannot suc-
cessfully carry out their duties if such determinations are' 
subject to an independent review and reconsideration by the 
Supreme Court. 
